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DISARMING ABUSERS AND TRIGGERING THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT: ARE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE MISDEMEANANTS GUARANTEED
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL?
Julia Hatheway*
Domestic violence is a global issue, but in the United States it is especially
lethal. Hundreds of women are shot and killed in the United States by
intimate partners every year. Federal and state legislatures have enacted
laws that focus on the issue of domestic violence and gun violence. In 1996,
Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968,
which permanently prohibits individuals convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors from possessing firearms. Twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia have also enacted laws that mirror the Lautenberg
Amendment. In many jurisdictions, misdemeanor domestic violence
convictions carry a maximum prison term of six months. Such offenses are
deemed “petty” and do not entitle the accused to the procedural right to a
jury trial. Following the enactment of domestic violence misdemeanor
firearm prohibitions, misdemeanants have challenged their convictions.
They have argued that the firearm prohibitions are so severe that they
upgrade the offenses to serious offenses and require jury trials under the
Sixth Amendment. Most courts have found that the firearm prohibitions are
not so severe that they guarantee the right to a jury trial. However, a
minority of courts have determined and some scholars argue that the firearm
prohibitions are severe and therefore guarantee the right to a jury trial.
This Note examines U.S. Supreme Court jury trial precedent and
scholarship on collateral consequences to consider whether firearm
prohibitions upgrade domestic violence misdemeanor offenses. Focusing on
Supreme Court precedent, legislative intent, and the movement to
incorporate collateral consequences into criminal procedure, this Note
argues that domestic violence misdemeanants, charged with presumptively
petty offenses and subject to permanent firearm prohibitions, are not
guaranteed the right to a jury trial.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2001, Rocky Mosure murdered his wife, Michelle Monson
Mosure, and their two young children.1 Michelle was twenty-three at the
time, and her two children were six and seven years old.2 On the day of the
murders, Rocky purchased a gun, returned to the family home, and killed his
wife and children before shooting himself.3
In early 2003, after years of abuse, Crystal Brame filed for divorce against
her husband, Tacoma Police Chief David Brame.4 In April 2003, David
murdered Crystal in front of the couple’s two children before shooting
himself.5
On Christmas Eve in 2016, seventeen-year-old Heather King went to break
up with her twenty-two-year-old boyfriend, Matthew Wilson.6 Wilson shot
and murdered Heather before killing himself.7
These women’s stories are sadly not unique. In the United States,
hundreds of women are shot and killed by their intimate partners every year.8
And each year, over ten million adults experience domestic violence or
intimate partner violence (IPV).9 Domestic violence is commonly defined as
a pattern of abusive behavior perpetrated against an intimate partner to
maintain power and control over that individual.10 This behavior can include
physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, and economic abuse, among
1. RACHEL LOUISE SNYDER, NO VISIBLE BRUISES: WHAT WE DON’T KNOW ABOUT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CAN KILL US 2–3 (2019).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 75–76.
4. Jerry Mitchell, Most Dangerous Time for Battered Women?: When They Leave,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jan. 28, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/
news/2017/01/28/most-dangerous-time-for-battered-women-is-when-they-leave-jerrymitchell/96955552/ [https://perma.cc/ZT4S-S23Y].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, GUNS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
AMERICA’S UNIQUELY LETHAL INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROBLEM 4 (2019),
https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/10/IPV-for-WEB-042921A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3NB-RXJW].
9. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NATIONAL STATISTICS DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 1 (2020), https://assets.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence2020080709350855.pdf?1596828650457 [https://perma.cc/7GC2-QUET]. Although the
terms “IPV” and “domestic violence” are often used interchangeably, domestic violence often
refers broadly to all violence between family members or violence that takes place in the home,
while IPV refers to violence between intimate partners. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra
note 8, at 6. For consistency, this Note uses the term “domestic violence” throughout.
10. Id.
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other forms of abuse.11 It is estimated that one in four women and one in ten
men have been abused by an intimate partner in the United States.12
The presence of guns in domestic violence situations often has lethal
results. The risk of domestic violence homicide increases by 400 percent
when the abuser has access to a gun.13 On average, abusers shoot and kill
fifty-seven women in the United States each month.14 Almost one million
women have been shot or shot at by an intimate partner.15 And this number
is increasing. Between 2008 and 2017, the number of female domestic
violence homicides increased by 15 percent.16 Women of color, including
Black, Native American, and Hispanic women, are more likely to be shot at
or killed by an intimate partner than white women.17
Access to guns coupled with domestic violence not only leads to the
murder of intimate partners but also is closely connected to mass shootings.
More than 50 percent of the individuals who carried out mass shootings in
the last ten years killed an intimate partner or family member.18 Thus,
prohibiting abusers’ access to guns is important to protect victims of
domestic violence and to reduce gun violence.
However, because the right to keep and bear arms is enshrined in the
Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,19 firearm prohibitions, which
infringe a constitutionally protected right, are a contentious issue and are
frequently challenged in court.20 One challenge that has emerged before a
few state and federal courts is based on the argument that permanent firearm
prohibitions that result from misdemeanor criminal convictions are so serious
a penalty that the accused must be guaranteed the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial.21
This Note analyzes the argument that the government cannot restrict an
individual’s Second Amendment right, while simultaneously denying the
individual’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Specifically, this Note
considers the issue of whether a penalty restricting an individual’s Second
Amendment right, stemming from a misdemeanor conviction, triggers the

11. See id. Not all acts of domestic abuse are illegal and thus are not criminally
prosecuted. Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview,
ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING, Jan. 2002, https://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/
ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume72002/No1Jan2002/Dom
esticViolenceandCriminalJustice.aspx [https://perma.cc/X4X2-C3XV].
12. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 1.
13. Id.
14. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4. While domestic violence affects
men, women, children, nonbinary, and gender nonconforming individuals, and can be
perpetrated by anyone, domestic violence is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against
women. See NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 1.
15. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 16–17.
18. Id. at 5.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
20. See infra Part I.B.2.
21. See infra Parts II.A.1–2, II.B.1–2.
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individual’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right as it pertains to domestic
violence misdemeanors.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides relevant background
information regarding Sixth Amendment and Second Amendment
jurisprudence and the history of federal and state legislation that seeks to
prohibit domestic abusers’ access to firearms. Part II examines two opposing
perspectives on whether permanent firearm prohibitions that apply as a result
of a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction are such serious penalties
that they upgrade a presumptively petty offense to a serious offense and
trigger the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. Part III argues
that a court presented with this question should find, based on Sixth
Amendment precedent, that a firearm prohibition stemming from a
misdemeanor domestic violence conviction does not trigger the accused’s
jury trial right. Part III also recommends that Congress, state legislatures,
and domestic violence advocates focus on enforcing firearm prohibitions and
enhancing civil protection orders that prohibit abusers from possessing
firearms to enhance domestic violence victims’ safety.
I. THE SIXTH AND SECOND AMENDMENTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
FIREARM PROHIBITIONS
Part I presents relevant Sixth and Second Amendment jurisprudence and
details the enactment and scope of federal and state legislation intended to
restrict domestic abusers’ access to firearms. Part I.A discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically the cases that
established and refined the applicable test to determine when a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is triggered by noncarceral penalties. Part
I.B reviews the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, including two of
the Court’s decisions that expanded the interpretation of the right to bear
arms, and discusses lower courts’ applications of different levels of scrutiny
to Second Amendment challenges. Part I.C introduces federal and state
legislation that restrict abusers’ access to firearms.
A. The Sixth Amendment: The Right to a Jury Trial for Serious Offenses
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial22 in criminal cases provides a
check on the government’s power to criminally prosecute individuals.23 The
jury trial right acts as a “safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”24
However, early Supreme Court precedent established that, despite the text of
the Sixth Amendment providing the right to an impartial jury in all criminal
prosecutions, not all criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a jury
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”).
23. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
24. Id. While the Sixth Amendment lists multiple rights afforded to an individual facing
a criminal prosecution, this Note focuses only on the right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
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trial.25 The rationale for restricting this procedural protection to certain
offenses rests on the notion that in less serious cases, the accused benefits
from an expeditious and inexpensive adjudication, which also lends greater
efficiency to the court system.26
The Supreme Court has long distinguished between petty and serious
offenses, finding that only the latter trigger the accused’s right to a jury
trial.27 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court relied on
precedent established at English common law and at the time the Constitution
was drafted to distinguish petty from serious offenses.28 The Court focused
on the nature of the offense, the penalty imposed, and the treatment of similar
penalties and offenses at common law to determine whether an offense was
petty or serious.29 In the second half of the twentieth century, the Court
began to expound a test to distinguish petty from serious offenses.
1. Distinguishing Petty Offenses from Serious Offenses
In Duncan v. Louisiana,30 the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury
trial in criminal prosecutions is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice and was incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 The Court emphasized the history of the jury trial right and
precedent at common law, as well as its establishment in both Article III and
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.32 The Court held that the jury trial
right for “serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all
defendants.”33 However, the Court cautioned that the jury trial right did not
extend to all crimes.34
Turning to the issue of petty offenses, the Court reaffirmed its previous
decisions35 and recognized that there were offenses to which the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial did not extend.36 While recognizing the
important role of the jury trial to protect the accused from injustice, the Court
also noted that, in some situations, an efficient and inexpensive nonjury
25. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624–27 (1937); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69–70 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888).
26. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158–60.
27. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58; Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624–27;
Schick, 195 U.S. at 69–70; Callan, 127 U.S. at 555.
28. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625–26; Schick, 195 U.S. at 69–70; Callan, 127 U.S. at 557.
29. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 623–25; Schick, 195 U.S. at 67–68; Callan, 127 U.S. at 556.
30. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. Id. at 149.
32. Id. at 151–57.
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id. (“[W]e hold no constitutional doubts about the practices . . . of . . . prosecuting
petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial”).
35. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58; District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 624–27 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69–70 (1904); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888).
36. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159.
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adjudication outweighed this concern.37 The Court suggested it need not
establish an absolute rule demarcating petty from serious offenses; however,
it nevertheless suggested that the appropriate line was a potential prison term
falling somewhere between six months and one year.38 In doing so, the Court
held that the potential maximum authorized penalty, not the penalty actually
imposed, was the relevant criteria to distinguish petty from serious
offenses.39 The Court also focused on the legislature’s intent, stating that
“[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality” reflected the legislature’s
perception of the offense in question.40
Two years after Duncan, the Court decided Baldwin v. New York,41 where
it explicitly established the line distinguishing petty from serious offenses.42
The Court held that a potential prison sentence of more than six months
signaled that the offense was serious and triggered the accused’s Sixth
Amendment jury trial right.43 In doing so, the Court held that New York
could not deny misdemeanants the right to a jury trial when they faced a
potential prison term of six months to one year.44
In its analysis, the Court held that the severity of the maximum potential
penalty for an offense was the most pertinent factor to consider when
distinguishing petty from serious offenses.45 The Court reasoned that the
six-month line was consistent with federal procedure, the system in place at
the time the Constitution was drafted, and the practices of the majority of
states.46 The Court further explained that the significant protections afforded
by a jury trial, especially the prevention of government oppression, became
particularly significant when individuals could be deprived of their liberty
for more than six months.47 While the Court recognized that establishing a
strict dividing point was to some degree arbitrary, it nevertheless held that
six months appropriately reflected a balancing point between the degree of
restriction on individual liberty requiring greater protection against
government oppression and the benefits of a speedy, efficient, and
inexpensive nonjury adjudication.48 The following section introduces the
Court’s jury trial analysis as it applies to noncarceral penalties.

37. Id. at 158–60.
38. Id. at 159–61. The Court recognized that the federal system drew this line at six
months, which was consistent with practices in the eighteenth century, and that forty-nine
states drew the line at one year. Id. at 161.
39. Id. at 159–60.
40. Id.
41. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
42. Id. at 69.
43. Id. (“[W]e have concluded that no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”).
44. Id. at 69–74.
45. Id. at 68.
46. Id. at 71–72.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id. at 73–74.
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2. Presumptively Petty Offenses and Noncarceral Penalties
In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,49 the Supreme Court held that an
offense with a maximum prison term of six months was presumptively petty
and that additional penalties attached to a conviction could enhance the
offense to become a serious offense if the additional penalties clearly
demonstrated that such was the intent of the legislature.50 The Court clarified
that “penalty” referred to the maximum period of incarceration, as well as to
fines, license suspensions, or community service requirements.51
In Blanton, Melvin R. Blanton and Mark D. Fraley were separately
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.52 Both Blanton and
Fraley requested jury trials, which the municipal court denied.53 On appeal,
the district court denied Blanton’s jury trial request but granted Fraley’s.54
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Blanton argued that the
additional penalties imposed entitled him to a jury trial.55 The Supreme
Court of Nevada determined that even with the additional penalties—namely
community service as an alternative to a maximum six-month prison term, a
ninety day driver’s license suspension, a $1000 fine, and a required alcohol
abuse course—the accused were not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment.56 The Supreme Court agreed.57
The Court identified that the most relevant measure to determine whether
an offense was serious or petty was the maximum potential penalty,
specifically the maximum potential prison term the accused might face.58
The Court explained that the measure provided an objective reflection of the
legislature’s determination that an offense is petty or serious.59
The Court further recognized that other potential penalties imposed by the
legislature demonstrated the perceived pettiness or seriousness of the
offense.60 However, it reaffirmed that the maximum period of incarceration
remained the most important measure.61 The Court reasoned that the severity
of the loss of liberty that resulted from a prison term longer than six months
was uniquely different from other penalties that restricted individual
freedoms.62 Thus, an additional statutory penalty likely would only upgrade
a presumptively petty offense to the level of a serious one if it was “so severe”
to unquestionably demonstrate the legislature’s intent that the offense was
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

489 U.S. 538 (1989).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 540–42.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.
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serious.63 The Court also noted that while many penalties infringe on an
individual’s rights, this infringement is not comparable to the loss of liberty
that results from an extended prison sentence.64 The Court acknowledged
that this standard was ambiguous but held that the penalties imposed on a
DUI (driving under the influence) misdemeanant in Nevada did not
demonstrate that the legislature intended to elevate the offense to a serious
offense.65
After Blanton, the Court has never held that a noncarceral penalty
upgrades a petty offense to a serious offense triggering the right to a jury
trial.66 The Court has found that a defendant, charged with multiple petty
offenses, is not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.67 It has also held that a
$5000 fine and a five-year probation term as a prison alternative do not
upgrade a presumptively petty offense.68 In that decision, the Court
recognized that additional penalties, including fines and probation terms, do
not “approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”69
3. Collateral Consequences and the Sixth Amendment
The Court’s decision in Blanton presented a framework for how courts
should assess collateral consequences, or noncarceral penalties, when
addressing the severity of the offense at issue and the right to a jury trial.
Collateral consequences are penalties or restrictions imposed on criminal
defendants, such as license restrictions, firearm prohibitions, sex offender
registration, public benefit eligibility, and deportation for noncitizens.70
Thousands of state and federal laws and regulations affect ex-offenders by
creating collateral consequences.71 These consequences are often justified
and promoted as regulations intended to increase public safety.72
Collateral consequences are distinguished from “direct” penalties,
specifically incarceration, because the former are labeled as civil penalties
and traditionally are not considered in the sentencing of defendants.73 This
distinction has been widely accepted and adopted into criminal procedure.74
The collateral consequences rule established the requirement that defense

63. Id. at 543.
64. Id. at 542.
65. Id. at 543–44.
66. Kansas v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
67. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327 (1996).
68. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1993).
69. Id. at 5 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542).
70. Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and
Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 240–42 (2018).
71. See John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral
Consequences, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Jan. 2018, at 36, 37.
72. Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Tenuous Line Between “Direct
Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences,” 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 370 (2016).
73. Malcolm, supra note 71, at 37.
74. See Kaiser, supra note 72, at 359–60.
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counsel need only inform a criminal defendant of direct consequences
resulting from a conviction or plea, not collateral consequences.75
Many scholars argue that the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences is misguided and incoherent.76 Critics argue that collateral
consequences are not only ineffective but also are often as, if not more,
burdensome and punitive than the direct consequences criminal defendants
face.77 These penalties can last longer than a prison term and can be
permanent.78 As such, critics have argued that criminal procedure should no
longer ignore noncarceral penalties.79
One of the Court’s decisions may demonstrate a trend toward
incorporating such consequences into criminal procedure and eliminating the
distinction between collateral and direct consequences.80 In Padilla v.
Kentucky,81 the Supreme Court held that constitutionally competent counsel
was required to advise a client if a conviction by guilty plea could result in
deportation.82 The Court also recognized that the direct-collateral dichotomy
was not applicable to deportation, given its close relationship with the
criminal process.83 This decision, which requires deportation to be addressed
in criminal procedure, moves away from the direct-collateral distinction and
contradicts the collateral consequences rule.84
While the Court has not recently considered whether criminal defendants
have the right to a jury trial in prosecutions where a conviction will result in
the defendant’s deportation, lower courts have considered this issue.85 In
Bado v. United States,86 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a
jury trial to a defendant charged with a deportable offense, regardless of the
maximum authorized prison term.87 The court reasoned that the consequence
of deportation was sufficiently severe that it transformed a presumptively
petty offense into a serious offense, triggering the accused’s Sixth

75. Id. at 359.
76. Chin, supra note 70, at 258; Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences
into Criminal Procedure, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 21 (2019); Kaiser, supra note 72, at
343; Malcolm, supra note 71, at 36–37.
77. Kaiser, supra note 72, at 343–46; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364
(2010) (“[D]eportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”).
78. See Kaiser, supra note 72, at 342–44.
79. See Crane, supra note 76, at 21–22.
80. Kaiser, supra note 72, at 344.
81. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
82. Id. at 359–60.
83. Id. at 365.
84. Crane, supra note 76, at 25.
85. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S 279, 290 (1904) (stating that
“the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury have no application” to
deportations).
86. 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018). For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Emily
Ahdieh, Comment, The Deportation Trigger:
Collateral Consequences and the
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial, 30 GEO. MASON C.R.L.J. 65 (2019).
87. Bado, 186 A.3d at 1260.
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Amendment jury trial right.88 The court found that deportation was a severe
penalty, in some cases having more damaging effects than incarceration.89
In People v. Suazo,90 the New York Court of Appeals came to the same
conclusion as the court in Bado.91 The court determined that defendants
facing deportation as a result of conviction must be guaranteed a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment.92
Part I.A focused on the Court’s jurisprudence and analysis of one
procedural right under the Sixth Amendment. Part I.B discusses the
substantive right guaranteed by the Second Amendment.
B. The Second Amendment: An Individual and Fundamental Right to Bear
Arms
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”93 Shortly after the
Constitution was ratified in 1787, Congress passed the Second Amendment
to protect the rights of individuals to keep militias in their respective states.94
The need to protect this right stemmed from the desire to protect state
sovereignty and to defend against the formation of an overly powerful federal
government.95 In the nineteenth century, the Court interpreted the Second
Amendment to restrict only the powers of the federal government, not the
powers of the states.96
The Court’s early Second Amendment jurisprudence also interpreted the
Second Amendment in relation to the preservation of a militia. In 1939, the
Court decided United States v. Miller,97 where it held that the Second
Amendment did not protect an individual’s right to possess a firearm, which
had no “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia.”98 Miller dealt with a Second Amendment challenge to a
provision of the National Firearms Act,99 which restricted the interstate
transportation of an unregistered shotgun with a barrel length measuring less

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1251.
90. 118 N.E.3d 168 (N.Y. 2018).
91. Id. at 171.
92. Id. But see generally Amezcua v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014)
(holding that a defendant was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment when facing deportation as a result of conviction, where the offense was
otherwise presumptively petty).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (holding that the Second
Amendment restricts only the powers of the federal government, not the powers of state
governments); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264 (1886) (same); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (same).
97. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
98. Id. at 178.
99. National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934) (repealed 1976).
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than eighteen inches.100 The Court held that the statute did not violate the
Second Amendment because the firearm in question was not related to the
preservation of the militia.101 In doing so, the Court focused on the Second
Amendment’s relationship to Article I of the Constitution, which affords
Congress the power to assemble a militia, comprised of the militias of each
state, in order to protect the safety and security of the nation and to enforce
its laws.102 It explained that the states ratified the Second Amendment to
ensure such power could be executed.103 Following its decision in Miller in
1939, the Court did not decide another Second Amendment case until 2008.
1. Heller and McDonald Individualize and Incorporate the Second
Amendment
In 2008, the Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller.104 In Heller,
the Court held that the Second Amendment was not limited to the right to
bear arms in relation to military service but was an individual right to keep
and bear arms.105 The Court struck down two laws passed by the District of
Columbia.106 The first required individuals to apply for and receive a license
to keep a handgun in their home, and the second required firearm owners to
store their guns either in a disassembled fashion or bound by a trigger lock.107
The Court found that banning handguns, “the most preferred firearm in the
nation,”108 or requiring firearms to be inoperable while stored109 denied
Americans the right to self-defense in the home, which the Court held was
critical to the Second Amendment right.110
The Heller decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, focused on
whether the Amendment’s prefatory clause, “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State”111 restricts the operative clause, “the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”112 If the
prefatory clause does restrict the operative clause, the right to carry a firearm
would exist only in connection to military service.113 Alternatively, if it does
not restrict the operative clause, the prefatory clause simply states the
Amendment’s purpose.114 The Court held the latter, that the prefatory clause

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
Id.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
Id.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 601–02.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 628–30.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 628–29.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–600.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
Id.
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clarified the purpose of the amendment—to preserve the existence of a
militia115—but did not influence the scope of the operative clause.116
The Court’s decision focused on the amendment’s text. Beginning with
the operative clause, the Court noted that “the people” referred to all
members of the political community117 and that “keep and bear Arms”
referred to possessing or carrying firearms for confrontation, specifically for
self-defense,118 regardless of their use for military purposes or the
individual’s military status.119 Turning to the prefatory clause, the Court held
that the “Militia” referred to all able-bodied men, that “well-regulated” meant
effectively trained, and that “security of a free State” referred to a safe and
free country.120
Finding that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to bear
arms, the Court was careful to recognize its limits.121 The Court
acknowledged that legislation regulating commercial gun sales, prohibiting
the possession of firearms by certain groups, including felons and people
with mental infirmities, and restricting the possession of firearms in specific
spaces, such as schools and government buildings, remained presumptively
lawful.122
The Court revisited its prior decisions and found that none precluded an
individual right analysis.123 The Court found that its previous decisions
reflected an interpretation of the right to bear arms that was broader than just
the right in connection to service in a militia,124 neglected to interrogate the
amendment’s scope,125 or dealt with laws that restricted firearms which fell
outside the amendment’s scope, and thus did not limit the right to military
use.126 Thus, the Court determined that its holding was consistent with
Second Amendment precedent.127
Two years after Heller, the Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago,128
where it held that the Second Amendment was a fundamental right and thus
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

115. Id. at 599.
116. Id. at 578.
117. Id. at 579–80.
118. Id. at 584–87.
119. Id. at 579–95.
120. Id. at 596–98.
121. Id. at 595.
122. Id. at 626–27.
123. Id. at 620–25.
124. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding that the Second
Amendment protected the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose).
125. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1886) (holding that a law prohibiting
unauthorized individuals from associating as a militia did not violate the Second Amendment).
126. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second
Amendment did not protect the right to possess a type of firearm that fell outside the
amendment’s scope); Heller, 554 U.S. at 620–25.
127. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
128. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

192

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Amendment.129 The ordinances at issue in McDonald required all
individuals to have a valid registration to own a firearm and prohibited the
registration of most handguns.130 The petitioners argued that these
ordinances prohibited them from possessing handguns in their homes for
self-defense.131
The Court sought to determine whether the Second Amendment was
incorporated against the states under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.132 Relying on Heller, the Court found that the
individual right to keep and bear arms, particularly for self-defense in the
home, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”133 Thus, the
Court held that the Second Amendment was binding on the states as a
fundamental right and Bill of Rights guarantee.134 Following the Court’s
decisions in Heller and McDonald, lower courts have sought to apply the
Court’s decisions to Second Amendment challenges.
2. Standards of Review Applied to Second Amendment Challenges
The Supreme Court did not identify in Heller or McDonald the level of
scrutiny that should be applied to Second Amendment challenges.135 This
section presents lower courts’ interpretations of this silence and their
applications of intermediate or strict scrutiny to Second Amendment
challenges.
In reviewing constitutional challenges, the Court tends to apply one of
three standards of review: rational basis review,136 intermediate scrutiny,137
or strict scrutiny.138 Rational basis review is the most deferential and least
129. Id. at 791. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 753–67.
133. Id. at 767–68. The Court proceeded to review precedent dating back to before the
Second Amendment’s ratification and found that the right was deeply rooted in the tradition
and history of the United States. See id. at 768–80.
134. Id. at 785.
135. In Heller, the Court stated that rational basis review was not the appropriate test for
Second Amendment challenges. 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
136. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2001)
(applying rational basis review); Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
291 (1984) (same); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (same); Ohio Bureau
of Emp. Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (same).
137. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying
intermediate scrutiny); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1982) (same).
138. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (applying strict
scrutiny); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (same); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (same); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (same); Att’y Gen. of New York v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986) (same).
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exacting standard.139 Rational basis review requires that the government
have a legitimate interest and that the challenged law be rationally related to
that interest.140 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government have an
important interest and that the challenged law be substantially related to that
interest.141 Strict scrutiny is the most stringent of the three standards.142 The
test applied under strict scrutiny requires that a statute be narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling state interest.143
As the Supreme Court has not identified the applicable standard of review
for Second Amendment challenges, lower courts have endeavored to
determine which standard is appropriate.144 When considering Second
Amendment challenges to federal law that prohibits domestic violence
misdemeanants from possessing a firearm,145 a number of lower courts have
applied intermediate scrutiny.146 Other courts have analyzed domestic
violence firearm prohibition challenges using strict scrutiny.147
To determine whether a law violates the Second Amendment, many courts
have employed the two-step test first expounded in United States v.
Marzzarella.148 The first step determines whether the conduct that is
restricted by the law is within the Second Amendment’s scope.149 If not, the
inquiry ends and the challenge fails.150 Alternatively, if the law imposes a
burden on conduct that falls within the amendment’s scope, courts employ
either intermediate or strict scrutiny to evaluate the law.151 Whether the law
passes under one of these tests determines if it is constitutional.152 Because
139. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
140. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Because the Court in Heller
explicitly stated that rational basis review was not the appropriate test for these challenges, it
will not be discussed further in this Note. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
628 n.27 (2008).
141. Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1567 (2009).
142. See Pena, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143. Gould, supra note 141, at 1566.
144. Id. at 1537–38.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); see infra Part I.C.1.
146. Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 206 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that § 922(g)(9) is
subject to intermediate scrutiny); Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2017)
(same); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v.
Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (same).
147. United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (D. Me. 2008) (finding that
“[r]educing domestic violence is a compelling government interest” and that a provision
prohibiting individuals subject to certain court orders from possessing a firearm was “narrowly
tailored to that compelling interest”); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024–
25 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that § 922(g)(8) is constitutional and that, were the court to apply
strict scrutiny, § 922(g)(8) would meet the requirements of a compelling state interest and
narrow tailoring); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556, 2008 WL 4534058, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (same); United States v. Grote, No. CR-08-6057, 2009 WL 853974,
at *7 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2009) (holding that § 922(g)(8) would pass either intermediate or
strict scrutiny).
148. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
149. Id. at 89.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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the Supreme Court has not prescribed a standard of review for gun laws, the
Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence has resulted in uncertainty.153
The next section focuses on federal and state legislation that was enacted to
reduce gun violence perpetrated by domestic abusers.
C. Domestic Violence Firearm Prohibitions
Over the past twenty-five years, Congress and state legislatures have
passed laws aimed at prohibiting domestic abusers from possessing firearms.
One challenge that implicates these laws argues that where individuals are
denied their Second Amendment right due to firearm prohibitions that result
from domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, those individuals must be
guaranteed the right to a jury trial. This challenge emerged after laws were
enacted at the federal and state levels to prohibit domestic violence
misdemeanants from possessing guns. This section discusses these federal
and state laws.
1. The Lautenberg Amendment
In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Control Act,154 which provided federal
oversight and control of the interstate commerce of firearms to support
anti-crime efforts of law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels.155
The provisions passed in 1968 made it unlawful for unlicensed firearm
manufacturers, importers, and dealers to sell or transport firearms or
ammunition in interstate commerce.156 The 1968 provisions also made it
unlawful for anyone convicted of a felony or deemed mentally infirm to
possess a gun.157
In 1994, Congress added § 922(g)(8) to the Gun Control Act, prohibiting
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by an individual subject to a court
order—commonly termed a restraining order, protective order, or order of
protection—that prohibits the individual from “harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person.”158 An order of protection is
often issued by a civil court after the petitioning party has demonstrated that
there has been an incident of domestic violence.159 A protective order
instructs the perpetrating party to cease contact with the petitioner and to
refrain from harassing or threatening them.160 Section 922(g)(8) requires a
153. See Gould, supra note 141, at 1549 (“Heller has simultaneously clarified and clouded
the constitutional mystery surrounding the Second Amendment.”); see also J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 280
(2009) (“The Court has invited future challenges . . . by not providing a standard of review for
firearms regulation”).
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–928.
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922–924.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 922.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 525, 535–36 (2003); Restraining Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
159. Restraining Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
160. See id.
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showing that the parties have an intimate partner relationship and that the
responding party presents a threat to the safety of the petitioning party or the
petitioning party’s child.161 The text mandates that the responding party
must be afforded a hearing and notice.162 A responding party that violates
this provision can be prosecuted and sentenced to a prison term of up to ten
years.163
In 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment164 to the Gun
Control Act of 1968.165 The Lautenberg Amendment prohibits individuals
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors under state or federal law from
owning or possessing firearms.166 Therefore, if an individual is convicted of
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and is later found in possession
of a firearm, that individual can be federally prosecuted under § 922(g)(9)
and sentenced to a prison term of up to ten years.167 The statute requires that
the elements of the underlying misdemeanor conviction include use or
attempted use of physical force and that the relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim fit one of the following categories: current or
former spouses, parents, guardians, persons who share a child in common, or
persons who currently or previously lived together in a spousal, parental,
guardian, or similar relationship.168
Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to “close th[e] dangerous
loophole,” whereby violent domestic abusers, who were charged with or pled
guilty to misdemeanors, were not prohibited from possessing firearms.169
Domestic abusers may be charged with or plead guilty to misdemeanors for
multiple reasons.170 Domestic abuse often occurs in private, and therefore
such cases often lack witnesses, corroboration, or physical evidence.171
Often police officers responding to domestic abuse are not equipped to deal
with such incidents or do not take victims seriously.172 Further, victims who
have been in abusive relationships may also suffer from battered women’s
syndrome, which, like post-traumatic stress disorder, can affect an
individual’s cognitive functions and precipitate coping mechanisms, such as
denial, minimization, and repression, which make it more difficult for a
victim to testify effectively.173 Lastly, victims face other factors that may
inhibit their desire or ability to participate in a prosecution, including a
victim’s relationship with the abuser, financial dependence on the abuser,
161. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)–(C)(i).
162. Id.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 924(2).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104-863, at 382–83 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
165. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 924(2).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
169. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009).
170. Erez, supra note 11.
171. See Michelle Byers, Note, What Are the Odds: Applying the Doctrine of Chances to
Domestic-Violence Prosecutions in Massachusetts, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551, 560 (2012).
172. Erez, supra note 11.
173. Byers, supra note 171, at 558.
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children in common with the abuser, or societal pressures that reinforce the
notion that domestic violence is a private matter.174
On multiple occasions the Supreme Court has clarified the applicability
and scope of § 922(g)(9).175 Lower courts have also upheld the relevant
section as constitutional, finding it does not violate the Second
Amendment.176
2. State Laws
Following the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment, twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that restrict domestic
abusers’ access to firearms.177 Some state laws that restrict domestic
violence misdemeanants’ access to firearms are more expansive than the
federal law. For example, some states define the relationship between the
abuser and the victim more broadly and may include dating partners or family
members, while other states restrict access to firearms for anyone convicted
of any violent misdemeanor.178 Sixteen states require convicted domestic
violence misdemeanants to relinquish any firearms they possess.179
Forty-three states have enacted laws that prohibit individuals subject to
domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms after notice
and a hearing.180 Some of these state laws are more restrictive than the
174. Ed Furman, Note, Addressing Evidentiary Problems in Prosecuting Domestic
Violence Cases Post-Crawford, 25 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 143, 146–51 (2016).
175. See, e.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2277–78 (2016) (holding that
§ 922(g)(9) applies where misdemeanor domestic assault is committed recklessly); United
States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 171 (2014) (interpreting the physical force requirement of
§ 922(g)(9)); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009) (holding that the domestic
relationship requirement of § 922(g)(9) must be established but need not be an element of the
predicate offense).
176. See, e.g., Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 211 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding § 922(g)(9)
is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1130
(9th Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); United
States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 168 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. White, 593 F.3d
1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that § 922(g)(9) is presumptively lawful); United States
v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (finding § 922(g)(9) constitutional
under intermediate scrutiny).
177. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22 n.75.
178. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/domestic-violence
-firearms/#state [https://perma.cc/3WJT-K54Z] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021); See, e.g., 430 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8(k), (l) (West 2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 29805 (West 2021).
179. Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 29810(a) (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801(8)(a)(I)(B) (West 2021); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-36k(a) (West 2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7.3(b) (West 2021);
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8(k), (l) (West 2021); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.26(2)(a)–(d)
(West 2021); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1002 (2021); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6234 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129B (West 2021); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.2242(3)(f)–(h) (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.361 (West 2021); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:25-27 (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.259(1)(c)–(d) (West 2021); 23
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(7) (West 2021); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 12-29-5(d)(3) (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(c)(6)(A) (West 2021).
180. Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178.
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federal law and require that specific circumstances be met before including a
firearm prohibition in the order.181
Twenty-one states prohibit individuals subject to an ex parte restraining
order from possessing firearms.182 Ex parte orders are granted almost
immediately after an individual petitions the court for a protective order,
before a hearing and notice.183 The temporary order remains in place until a
hearing or trial takes place, following notice to the respondent, at which point
the court decides whether to issue a final order of protection.184 The
following section discusses the effects of these laws.
3. Domestic Violence Gun Laws and Victim Safety
Statistics suggest that laws restricting domestic abusers’ access to firearms
increase victims’ safety.185 States that restrict access to firearms by
individuals subject to domestic violence protection orders reported a
reduction of domestic violence firearm homicides by 13 percent.186 States
that require or encourage those who are subject to domestic violence
protection orders to relinquish guns and ammunition have reported a
reduction in domestic violence firearm homicides of 14 to 16 percent.187
Moreover, between 1998 and 2019, federal background checks blocked the
sale of almost 400,000 firearms to domestic abusers, either misdemeanants
or individuals subject to protective orders.188
While many state and federal legislatures have enacted laws aimed at
reducing domestic violence gun violence, these laws have been challenged,
in some cases successfully, in both federal and state courts.189 Successful
procedural challenges, which argue that domestic violence misdemeanants
subject to § 922(g)(9) or comparable state laws are entitled to a jury trial
because of the severity of such a penalty, could result in fewer prosecutions
of domestic abusers under offenses that trigger firearm prohibitions.190 This
could result in fewer victims receiving the protection such laws were enacted
to provide. Part II presents opposing arguments to these challenges.

181. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (West 2021) (requiring “the
respondent to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the respondent if the court finds
that the respondent was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the commission
of the domestic violence”).
182. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22 n.75.
183. See Sarah Martin, Evidence-Based, Constitutionally-Sound Approaches to Reducing
Gun Violence, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 245, 267 (2018); see also Restraining Order, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
184. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178.
185. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 25. This only covers sales by licensed dealers. Domestic abusers can still
illegally purchase firearms privately and at gun shows. Id.
189. See infra Part II.
190. See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
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II. DO FIREARM PROHIBITIONS TRIGGER MISDEMEANANTS’ JURY TRIAL
RIGHT?
In Blanton, the Supreme Court set forth its Sixth Amendment jury trial
analysis to determine whether a noncarceral consequence upgrades a
presumptively petty offense—an offense with a maximum prison term of six
months—to a serious offense, triggering the accused’s jury trial right.191
This part discusses the conflict that has emerged as courts apply the Blanton
analysis to determine whether misdemeanants, who face restrictions to their
Second Amendment rights, are entitled to a jury trial.
Part II.A presents the argument that those subject to restrictions of their
Second Amendment rights, due to domestic violence misdemeanor
convictions, must be guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment. Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 present case law from a federal district
court and one state supreme court that determined that domestic violence
misdemeanants are guaranteed the right to a jury trial due to the severity of
applicable firearm prohibitions. Part II.A.3 introduces scholarly analysis that
incorporates collateral consequences into criminal procedure and argues that
domestic violence misdemeanants are guaranteed the right to a jury trial. Part
II.B discusses the argument that domestic violence misdemeanants, who are
prohibited from possessing firearms, are not guaranteed the right to a jury
trial. Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 present relevant case law from federal and state
courts. Part II.B.3 introduces the work of Professor Sandra Mayson, who
advocates for keeping collateral consequences distinct from direct
consequences.
A. Firearm Prohibitions Are Serious and Guarantee Misdemeanants the
Right to a Jury Trial
Most state and federal courts that have expressly addressed whether a
domestic violence misdemeanant is afforded the right to a jury trial have
found that a restriction on an accused’s Second Amendment right, as a result
of a misdemeanor conviction, does not trigger the right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment.192 However, in United States v. Smith193 and
Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court,194 both an Oklahoma federal
district court and the Nevada Supreme Court found that firearm prohibitions
resulting from misdemeanor convictions do upgrade the offense and trigger
the accused’s jury trial right.195
1. Smith: The Lautenberg Amendment Imposes a Serious Punishment
In United States v. Smith, the accused, who was charged with misdemeanor
assault of his ex-wife, faced a maximum prison term of six months and was
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.1.
151 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Okla. 2001).
448 P.3d 1120 (Nev. 2019).
See Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; Andersen, 448 P.3d at 1124.
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subject to § 922(g)(9).196 Smith requested a jury trial, which the court
granted.197 The district court found that the permanent firearm prohibition
was a serious punishment, demonstrating the seriousness of the offense and
thus guaranteed Smith the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.198
The court’s reasoning was threefold. First, it found that firearm prohibitions
are serious because of the important role guns play in American life—for
self-defense, in leisure activities, and in the military.199 Second, the court
stated that gun restrictions reflect serious penalties given the divisiveness and
urgency of such restrictions in public discourse.200 And third, it asserted that
the severity of the penalty for violating § 922(g)(9), and the fact that the
neighboring provisions of § 922(g) applied to dangerous individuals,
including convicted felons, reflected the seriousness of the provision.201
The court recognized that its holding diverged from the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Chavez,202 but it determined that the Eleventh
Circuit’s analysis was misplaced.203 The court reasoned that the appropriate
analysis looked at the severity of the penalty imposed by Congress, not at
whether Congress was aware that domestic violence misdemeanants, subject
to the firearm prohibition, may not have the right to a jury trial in underlying
proceedings.204
2. Andersen: The Nevada Legislature Determined Domestic Battery Is a
Serious Offense
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Nevada in Andersen v. Eighth Judicial
District Court held that because the legislature had specifically added a
penalty prohibiting individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence
battery from possessing firearms, “the Legislature ha[d] determined that the
offense [was] a serious one.”205 The court therefore found that the accused
was guaranteed the right to a jury trial.206
In Andersen, Christopher Andersen was charged with domestic battery and
simple battery.207 Andersen demanded a jury trial, which the municipal court
denied on the basis of the misdemeanor offense having a maximum prison
sentence of six months, which was presumptively petty.208 Andersen entered
a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge, and the court dismissed the
196. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
197. Id. at 1318.
198. Id. at 1317.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1317–18.
202. 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). In Chavez, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that
Congress had specifically intended for § 922(g)(9) to apply regardless of an individual’s right
to a jury trial in the underlying proceeding. Id. at 1314.
203. See Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1122.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1123 (citing Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542–43 (1989)).
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simple battery charge.209 On appeal, Andersen argued that the additional
penalties, specifically the firearm prohibition, signified that the legislature
had determined the offense was serious, triggering his Sixth Amendment jury
trial right.210 The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed.211 The court, citing
U.S. Supreme Court precedent,212 stated that the maximum penalty imposed
by the legislature provided the appropriate framework to determine whether
the legislature deemed the offense to be serious.213 Specifically, the court
found that because the Nevada legislature had added a provision that
restricted the right to possess a firearm “that automatically and directly flows
from a conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery . . . . this new
penalty . . . ‘clearly reflect[s] a legislative determination that the offense [of
misdemeanor domestic battery] is a serious one.’”214
The Supreme Court of Nevada clarified and differentiated the Andersen
holding from its 2014 decision in Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial District
Court.215 In Amezcua, the court held that misdemeanor domestic battery was
not a serious offense such that the accused must be guaranteed the right to a
jury trial.216 The court held that the additional penalties, including the
permanent federal firearm prohibition, did not reflect the Nevada
legislature’s determination that the offense was so serious as to implicate the
right to a jury trial.217 At the time the court decided Amezcua, there was no
Nevada state law restricting a domestic violence misdemeanant’s access to
firearms.218 Instead, Amezcua dealt with the federal law, § 922(g)(9).219 The
court determined that because the firearm penalty arose out of federal law, it
was a collateral consequence and was not indicative of the Nevada
legislature’s perspective that the offense was serious.220
In Andersen, the court identified that the difference between the present
case and Amezcua was the Nevada legislature’s intervening decision to
amend the statute prohibiting specific groups from possessing firearms to
cover anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.221
The court found that the legislature’s action demonstrated that it perceived
misdemeanor domestic battery to be a serious offense, triggering the
accused’s right to a jury trial.222

209. Id. at 1122.
210. See id. at 1122–24.
211. Id. at 1123.
212. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542; United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
213. Andersen, 448 P.3d at 1123.
214. Id. at 1124 (third and fourth alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543).
215. 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014).
216. See id. at 606.
217. See id. at 605.
218. Id. at 604; see also Andersen, 448 P.3d at 1123.
219. Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 604.
220. See id. at 605.
221. See Andersen, 448 P.3d at 1123; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360 (West 2021).
222. See Andersen, 448 P.3d at 1124.

2021]

DISARMING ABUSERS

201

The Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision has disrupted the state’s criminal
justice system.223 Following Andersen, the Las Vegas city council passed a
law creating a domestic violence criminal offense that does not restrict those
convicted of domestic violence from possessing firearms.224 The city
enacted this new provision because, due to the lack of resources, it was
unable to conduct jury trials for domestic violence misdemeanors.225 Since
Andersen, Nevada courts have charged domestic abusers with simple battery
and other offenses that do not trigger the defendant’s jury trial right.226 As a
result, these individuals can lawfully possess guns, while their victims are
not protected by federal or state firearm prohibitions.227
3. Incorporating Collateral Consequences Would Require Jury Trials for
Domestic Violence Misdemeanants
Some scholars argue that collateral consequences, including gun
prohibitions, function as additional forms of punishment that criminal
procedure fails to consider.228 Professor Paul T. Crane argues that collateral
consequences should be incorporated into criminal procedure.229 Crane
developed a framework to consistently incorporate collateral
consequences.230 In developing his framework, Crane focuses on four
collateral consequences: deportation, sex offender registration, firearm
prohibitions, and disqualification of public benefits.231 Crane applies the
Blanton analysis to determine whether a collateral consequence triggers the
right to a jury trial.232
Crane’s multistep framework first determines that only automatically
imposed consequences trigger a procedural right.233 Next, Crane argues that
whether a collateral consequence triggers a procedural right depends on
whether the consequence is as severe as the potential prison term triggering
that right.234 To compare the severity of imprisonment to different collateral
consequences, Crane compares the degree to which the consequence impedes
on the individual’s constitutional liberty interest to the degree to which the
223. See generally Miranda Wilson, Las Vegas Approves Domestic Violence Charge That
Doesn’t Take Offenders’ Guns, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 18, 2020, 3:46 PM),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2019/oct/16/las-vegas-approves-new-domestic-violencecharge-th/ [https://perma.cc/6M3Q-J3PV].
224. See LAS VEGAS, N.V., MUN. CODE tit. 10, § 10.32.010-020 (2019); see also Wilson,
supra note 223.
225. See Wilson, supra note 223.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 76, at 29–61; Chin, supra note 70, at 235–46; Kaiser,
supra note 72, at 343–44; Malcolm, supra note 71, at 42.
229. See Crane, supra note 76, at 62.
230. See id. at 29–61.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 10.
232. See id. at 54–61.
233. See id. at 30–31.
234. See id. at 32. Crane’s framework also considers the right to counsel. Id. at 43–49.
This Note only considers Crane’s framework as applied to the jury trial right.
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relevant prison term infringes on an individual’s liberty interest.235 Crane
also argues that when considering the jury trial right, collateral consequences
imposed by a different sovereign from the one prosecuting the offense should
not be considered because they do not reflect the intent or perspective of the
legislature that enacted the law under which the defendant is being
prosecuted.236
Applying this framework to firearm prohibitions, Crane determines that
prohibitions permanently restricting firearm possession are equivalent to a
prison term ranging from one day to six months.237 Under Crane’s
framework, firearm prohibitions are less severe than deportation and sex
offender registration requirements but more severe than disqualification of
public benefits.238 Crane finds that permanent firearm prohibitions, “viewed
in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration,” should
trigger the accused’s jury trial right under the Sixth Amendment.239
However, Crane qualifies his finding and states that, in a case where the
accused does not face any potential prison term, the permanent firearm
prohibition should not trigger the jury trial right.240
While scholars and courts alike have found that firearm prohibitions are
sufficiently severe to overcome the presumption that an offense is petty and
to guarantee the right to a jury trial, a majority of state and federal courts
have found the opposite.
B. Firearm Prohibitions Do Not Trigger Misdemeanants’ Right to a Jury
Trial
Over the past two decades, following the passage of § 922(g)(9) and
similar state laws, a majority of federal and state courts that have considered
whether the accused is guaranteed the right to a jury trial where a
misdemeanor conviction will result in a permanent restriction of the
defendant’s Second Amendment right have found that there is no guaranteed
right to a jury trial in such cases.241 This part analyzes those decisions and
the issue of collateral consequences and criminal procedure.
1. Section 922(g)(9) Does Not Upgrade a Presumptively Petty Offense
In United States v. Chavez,242 the Eleventh Circuit held that the accused’s
jury trial right was not triggered when he was permanently prohibited from
possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(9) as a result of his misdemeanor assault
235. See id. at 40.
236. See id. at 55.
237. See id. at 41.
238. See id. at 41–42.
239. Id. at 59–60 (quoting Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989)).
240. See id. at 60 n.285.
241. See generally United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Snow, No. 11-0149, 2011 WL 5025535 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2011); United States v. Jardee, No.
09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 05CR271,
2005 WL 3262983 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005).
242. 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
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conviction.243 Zoilo Chavez was convicted of misdemeanor assault under
federal law for assaulting his wife.244 The Eleventh Circuit found that
Chavez was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial because misdemeanor
assault was a petty offense and Chavez had not established that Congress
deemed the offense to be serious when it added the firearm prohibition.245
Specifically, the court reasoned that because the language in 18 U.S.C. § 921
acknowledges that those subject to § 922(g)(9) includes misdemeanants who
may not be entitled to a jury trial, the court found that Congress did not intend
for the provision to upgrade relevant underlying petty offenses under the
Sixth Amendment jury trial analysis.246
In 2005, the District of Nebraska was faced with the same question in
United States v. Combs.247 Richard Combs was charged with misdemeanor
domestic battery.248 Combs was convicted and sentenced to two days in jail
and six months of probation; however, he faced a maximum prison term of
six months and was subjected to § 922(g)(9).249 Combs argued that the
lifetime firearm prohibition upgraded the petty offense to a serious offense
and thus guaranteed his right to a jury trial.250 The district court held that the
permanent firearm prohibition did not upgrade the petty offense and found
that Combs was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.251 The court held that
there was no evidence that Combs required a gun for any specific, legal
purpose.252
Two district courts answered this question after the Supreme Court ruled
in Heller. Both courts found that the accused was not guaranteed the right to
a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Jardee,253 a
North Dakota federal district court found that the federal firearm prohibition
neither upgraded the otherwise petty offense to a serious offense nor
triggered the accused’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right.254 The court,
relying on the Supreme Court’s jury trial precedent, recognized that the
maximum potential prison term was the most important factor to consider
and that the firearm prohibition was a collateral consequence.255 The court
found, however, that analyzing the lifetime firearm prohibition under the
Supreme Court’s analysis required examining whether the penalty resulted
in a severe deprivation of liberty, comparable to the deprivation resulting
from a prison term of more than six months.256 The court held that while the
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 1310, 1314.
Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1310–11.
Id. at 1314; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(II)(aa)–(bb).
No. 05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005).
Id. at *1–3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *3.
No. 09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2010).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3–4.

204

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

firearm prohibition infringed on Jardee’s rights, it did not infringe on his
rights to the degree necessary to upgrade the offense to a serious offense.257
The court also reasoned that when Congress added the relevant provision, it
was aware that misdemeanants subject to § 922(g)(9) may not have been
guaranteed the right to a jury trial in the underlying state or federal
prosecution.258
Similarly, in United States v. Snow,259 the Oregon federal district court
found that Brian Gene Snow, who was charged with assault qualifying as a
domestic violence misdemeanor and subject to § 922(g)(9), was not entitled
to a jury trial because the crime was a petty offense and Snow had not
demonstrated that the firearms prohibition turned the presumptively petty
offense into a serious one.260 The court explained, relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Blanton, that the presumption was a high bar to overcome
because it rested on the liberty interest lost from a six-month prison term,
which is “‘intrinsically different’ from any other penalty.”261
Very few state supreme courts have confronted this issue, and of those that
have, most have found that a domestic violence misdemeanant is not
guaranteed the right to a jury trial.262 Both the Supreme Court of Arizona
and the Court of Appeals of Kansas have found that the accused, charged
with a domestic violence misdemeanor, is not guaranteed a jury trial when,
if convicted, they will be permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm
under § 922(g)(9).263 The Court of Appeals of Kansas focused on legislative
intent and reasoned that the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession was
irrelevant to the Kansas legislature’s intent or perspective.264 The court held
that only the state legislature’s intent should be taken into account when
considering the seriousness of an offense for the Sixth Amendment jury right
analysis.265 The court also noted that the Supreme Court had never found
that a noncarceral penalty upgraded a presumptively petty offense to a serious
one.266
The Supreme Court of Arizona reached the same conclusion and held that
the defendant, convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, and subject to
§ 922(g)(9), was not guaranteed the right to a jury trial.267 The court stated
that the maximum potential punishment imposed by the legislature

257. Id. at *4.
258. Id.
259. No. 11-0149, 2011 WL 5025535 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2011).
260. Id. at *3.
261. Id. at *2. (quoting Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989)).
262. See Kansas v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944–45 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016); Arizona ex
rel. McDougall v. Strohson, 945 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc). But see Andersen
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 448 P.3d 1120, 1123–24 (Nev. 2019).
263. Woolverton, 371 P.3d at 944; Strohson, 945 P.2d at 1258.
264. Woolverton, 371 P.3d at 944–45. The court affirmed its holding two years later in
Kansas v. Race, No. 117,536, 2018 WL 1247211, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).
265. Woolverton, 371 P.3d at 944–45.
266. Id. at 944.
267. Strohson, 945 P.2d at 1255.
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prosecuting the crime determined whether an offense was petty or serious.268
The court explained that it was not feasible for the state court to account for
every potential federal consequence or penalty a defendant faces when
prosecuted under state law.269 The following section introduces a petition to
the Supreme Court that asked the Court to consider whether firearm
prohibitions are serious penalties that trigger the right to a jury trial.
2. Zoie H.: Nebraska Declines to Follow Nevada Precedent
In October 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to the petition,
Zoie H. v. Nebraska,270 wherein the petitioner asked the Court to consider
whether firearm prohibitions were serious penalties triggering the right to a
jury trial.271 The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred
when it upheld the decision by a judge, in a juvenile proceeding, denying the
juvenile a jury trial where the juvenile would be prohibited from possessing
a firearm until she turned twenty-five.272 The case dealt with the application
of a newly enacted state statute extending a firearm prohibition to cover
juvenile offenders.273 The lower court denied the juvenile’s request for a
jury trial, reasoning that Nebraska requires juvenile proceedings to occur
before a judge and not a jury.274 The Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed.275 The court stated that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right did
not apply to the juvenile because the firearms prohibition was not a penalty
but a collateral consequence.276 In the petition to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the petitioner argued that the firearm prohibition, which “directly and
automatically” deprived the juvenile of her right to bear arms until she turned
twenty-five, upgraded the juvenile offense to a serious offense, triggering the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right.277
The petitioner relied extensively on the Supreme Court of Nevada’s
Andersen278 decision and argued that Andersen was consistent with the
Court’s Second Amendment precedent, while the Supreme Court of
Nebraska’s decision was inconsistent with such precedent.279 The petitioners
further argued that because the Court had held in Heller280 and McDonald281
that the right protected by the Second Amendment is an individual and
fundamental right, to deprive an individual of that fundamental constitutional
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1256.
270. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–10, Zoie H. v. Nebraska, 141 S. Ct. 259 (2020)
(No. 19-1418), 2020 WL 3512841, at *9–10.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 7–9.
273. Id. at 9; see NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1204.05(1) (West 2021).
274. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 270.
275. In re Zoie H., 937 N.W.2d 801 (Neb.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 259 (2020).
276. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 270, at 11.
277. Id. at 10–11.
278. See supra Part II.A.2.
279. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 270, at 13–15.
280. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
281. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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right, the accused must have the protections of the Constitution that are
guaranteed for serious criminal proceedings, specifically the right to a jury
trial.282
The respondent argued that the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s decision was
correct because the prohibition was intended to act as a public safety
regulation, not as a punishment, and thus because it was not punitive, it was
not an additional penalty.283 The respondent also stated that because the
legislature did not authorize any period of incarceration for the juvenile
adjudication, the offense was not serious because the applicable test, which
analyzes the civil penalty together with the maximum potential prison term,
was inapplicable where there was no potential term of imprisonment attached
to the offense.284 The respondent also emphasized that the prohibition as
applied to juveniles was temporary.285 The Supreme Court denied the
petitioner’s writ of certiorari in October 2020 and thus declined to hear the
case.286 The following section discusses the difficulties of classifying and
incorporating collateral consequences.
3. Keeping Collateral Consequences Collateral
In response to scholars’ calls to incorporate collateral consequences and
abolish the direct-collateral dichotomy,287 Professor Sandra Mayson argues
that collateral consequences should be analyzed separately.288 Mayson
argues that because most collateral consequences focus on reducing future
risk and are thus part of the preventive state, they are not punishment, which
is inherently tied to culpability and blame.289 Unlike punishment, which
seeks to assign punitive sentences commensurate with an individual’s
conduct, preventive restraints employ cost-benefit analysis of the risk of
future harm—the security interest—and the liberty deprivation caused by the
measure.290
Mayson theorizes that distinguishing collateral consequences from
punishment encourages more thorough consideration of collateral
consequences and of their purpose, legitimacy, and constitutionality.291
Recognizing the important societal role preventive restraints play, as well as
the harmful effects collateral consequences can have, Mayson argues that
282. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 270, at 12–13.
283. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 27–29, Zoie H. v. Nebraska, 141 S. Ct. 259 (2020)
(No. 19-1418), 2020 WL 4678907, at *27–29. The respondents also argued that the Nevada
and Nebraska decisions deal with substantially different situations and proceedings—juvenile
versus criminal—and thus argued that no split, and no question for the Court, emerged. Id. at
17–20.
284. Id. at 29.
285. Id. at 30.
286. In re Zoie H., 937 N.W.2d 801 (Neb.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 259 (2020).
287. See supra Part II.A.3.
288. Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 301, 361 (2015).
289. Id. at 318–19.
290. Id. at 324–26.
291. Id. at 361.
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proper oversight of such restrictions is important to protect individual liberty,
enhance public safety, and guard against the proliferation of unconstitutional
or unnecessary collateral consequences.292
Mayson does not claim to establish a formal test to determine whether a
collateral consequence is a preventive measure; however, she argues the
purported purpose for which the restriction was authorized is instructive.293
Specifically, whether a collateral consequence was enacted to punish
culpable conduct or to prevent future harm distinguishes punishment from
preventive restrictions.294 Mayson suggests that collateral consequences fall
along a spectrum from purely preventive to purely retributive.295 Mayson
proposes that often probation or parole would fall in the middle of the
spectrum and argues that most collateral consequences, focused on potential
future risks, should be designated as preventive restraints.296 Moreover,
Mayson argues that the degree to which preventive restraints infringe on
individual liberty must be proportional to the perceived risk.297
Under this framework, Mayson contends that collateral consequences
should be afforded procedural guarantees, considered in sentencing, and
scrutinized to dispose of any unconstitutional provisions.298 Mayson
proposes that the severity of the consequence, not its purpose for punishment
or prevention, should determine procedural guarantees.299 And, Mayson
argues that applicable collateral consequences, while not punishment, should
be considered by judges when imposing a sentence, to give effect to the
purposes of deterrence and rehabilitation.300 Lastly, Mayson asserts that
collateral consequences should not be afforded the presumption of
constitutionality and instead should be scrutinized to determine whether such
provisions require the disparate treatment of convicted persons.301 Mayson
asserts that such analysis calls for a heightened degree of scrutiny and that
only those restrictions that are narrowly applied—in scope, form, and
duration—would survive such review.302 Mayson also argues that collateral
consequences should not be applied categorically—but should instead be
reviewed on an individual basis, considering liberty interests, risks, and
safety concerns at issue—and should be imposed through separate civil
proceedings.303
While Professor Mayson does not speak specifically to firearm
prohibitions applying to domestic violence misdemeanants, she does
characterize firearm prohibitions generally as falling at the preventive end of
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 334, 346.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 351.
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the punishment-prevention spectrum.304 Felon firearm prohibitions are
enacted to prevent gun crimes and are concerned with future harm and, thus,
future risk.305
III. FOLLOWING LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FOCUSING ON VICTIM SAFETY
This part is divided into two sections. Part III.A argues that courts,
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, should find that an individual, who
has been charged with misdemeanor domestic violence and who may thus be
permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm, is not guaranteed the right
to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment because such prohibitions do not
infringe on the individual’s liberty to the degree a prison term of more than
six months does. While the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari when
presented with a similar question, the issue may continue to emerge in state
or federal courts. Part III.B sets forth recommendations for Congress, state
legislatures, and domestic violence advocates to improve domestic violence
victims’ safety. These recommendations focus on enforcing and expanding
firearm prohibitions, specifically those stemming from civil protective
orders.
A. Applying Blanton and Incorporating Firearm Prohibitions
This section considers the issue set forth in Part II by revisiting Supreme
Court precedent and applying Professor Crane’s306 framework of
incorporating collateral consequences to consider whether a domestic
violence misdemeanant is guaranteed the right to a jury trial. This Note
follows the approach taken by the majority of courts and argues that courts
should find that permanent firearm prohibitions do not upgrade petty
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses to serious offenses so as to
guarantee misdemeanants the right to a jury trial.
This Note argues that, first, collateral consequences should be scrutinized
and rejected if they are unconstitutional and, second, constitutional collateral
consequences should be factored into criminal procedure to determine
whether such additional restrictions infringe on the accused’s liberty to such
a degree as to require additional procedural protections. This Note argues,
based on Supreme Court and lower court precedent, that § 922(g)(9) is
constitutional under intermediate or strict scrutiny307 and that misdemeanor
domestic violence firearm prohibitions can be presumed constitutional under
Professor Mayson’s analysis.308
While Professor Mayson argues that collateral consequences should be
analyzed separately from direct consequences, she also contends that
criminal procedure should account for the severity of deprivation of liberty
imposed by restrictions, regardless of their purpose as punitive or
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 336.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text.
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preventive.309 As set forth by the Supreme Court, this analysis requires
comparing collateral and direct penalties.310 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated a willingness to dissolve the collateral-direct distinction.311
Thus, this Note applies Supreme Court precedent to determine whether
permanent firearm prohibitions upgrade petty offenses and trigger the jury
trial right.
In Blanton, the Supreme Court determined that the severity of the penalty
imposed by the legislature is indicative of the legislature’s determination that
the offense is serious.312 Firearm prohibitions—and other collateral
consequences—are imposed by both the federal and state legislatures.313
Thus, when considering whether the jury trial right is guaranteed, it is
consequential whether the same sovereign is prosecuting the offense and
implementing the collateral consequence.314 This issue is highlighted by the
Supreme Court of Nevada’s decisions in Andersen and Amezcua.315 In
Andersen and Amezcua, the defendants were convicted of misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence and as a result were prohibited from possessing
firearms.316 While the penalties were nearly identical, the disparate
outcomes depended on the sovereign imposing the penalty.317
The Andersen and Amezcua decisions likely demonstrate the appropriate
approach to legislative intent. The Court expounded this approach in Duncan
when it recognized that courts should look to the “penalty authorized by the
law of the locality” to assess the severity of an offense.318 While this
approach undoubtedly appears futile or arbitrary from the perspective of the
accused, whose concern is the liberty lost, it would be problematic to confuse
or intertwine the intent of distinct sovereigns. First, to do so would trigger
issues of federalism because it would blur the line between the separate
sovereigns of the state and federal governments and would be contrary to the
practice of applying legislative intent. Second, failure to separate the
sovereigns would result in the immense task of upending state and federal
criminal procedure to account for the thousands of federal and state laws that
affect defendants regardless of whether they are prosecuted by the federal or
state government.319
The next consideration is the liberty interest at stake. In Baldwin, the Court
focused on distinguishing severe from petty penalties by examining the
severity of the penalty, namely the length of the prison term.320 The Court’s
309. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part I.A.2.
311. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
312. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989).
313. See supra Parts I.C.1–2.
314. See Crane, supra note 76, at 55.
315. See Andersen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 448 P.3d 1120, 1123–24 (Nev. 2019)
(distinguishing Andersen from the court’s previous decision in Amezcua).
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968).
319. See Chin, supra note 70, at 240–42. That task is beyond the scope of this Note.
320. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1970).
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analysis centered on the deprivation of liberty resulting from a prison term of
more than six months.321 In Blanton, the Court held that if a collateral
consequence was so severe that it demonstrated that the legislature
considered the offense to be serious, it would upgrade the otherwise petty
offense to a serious one if the additional penalty “approximate[d] in severity
the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”322 The Court emphasized the
unique severity of a prison term of more than six months and explained how
this loss of liberty was distinct from other penalties that infringe on other
freedoms.323
Based on this precedent, a constitutional test determining whether a
collateral consequence upgrades an otherwise petty offense to a serious
offense should consider whether the additional penalty or consequence is a
proxy for confinement or a restriction on the liberty interests that
imprisonment infringes.324 As set forth by Professor Crane, to upgrade the
offense, the penalty must encroach on the liberty interest to a degree
comparable to the degree a prison term of more than six months would.325
The argument that domestic violence misdemeanants should be guaranteed
the right to a jury trial has rested on the Heller and McDonald decisions,
which deemed the Second Amendment right to gun ownership to be
individual and fundamental.326 Thus, a permanent firearm prohibition is
such a severe restriction that it reflects the legislature’s determination that the
offense is serious.327 However, the Court has not determined that the right
to a jury trial applies when the right that is infringed is fundamental but
whether the interest restricted is that liberty interest that is infringed by a
prison term of more than six months.328 In Duncan, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right was a fundamental right.329 However, the
Court did not adopt the reasoning that the jury trial right was automatically
triggered when a fundamental right was restricted.330 Arguably, the opposite
is true. The Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to mean that the
accused is not always guaranteed the right to a jury trial.331 Instead, when a
criminal prosecution begins and the accused’s liberty is potentially infringed,
one or more of the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights are triggered.332 The

321. Id. at 72.
322. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989).
323. See id. at 542; see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (noting that
the collateral consequence did not infringe on the defendant’s liberty to the degree infringed
on by a prison term).
324. See United States v. Snow, No. 11-0149, 2011 WL 5025535 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2011);
United States v. Jardee, No. 09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2010).
325. Crane, supra note 76, at 32.
326. See supra Part II.
327. See supra Part II.A.2.
328. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989).
329. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
330. See id. at 159–61.
331. See id. at 159.
332. Id.
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right that is triggered depends on the degree to which the accused’s liberty
interest is restricted.333
Additionally, as Professor Crane notes, other penalties actually infringe on
one’s relevant liberty interest to a greater degree than firearms prohibitions
do.334 Deportation, like imprisonment, results in the physical removal of
individuals from their families, communities, and work.335 Sex offender
registration requirements can restrict where individuals can live, at times
removing them from their families and communities or requiring that the
individuals be monitored by GPS.336 By contrast, while permanent firearms
prohibitions infringe on an individual’s Second Amendment right, they
infringe on one’s relevant liberty interest—that which is restricted when an
individual serves more than six months in prison—to a lesser degree than
deportation or sex offender registration do.337
Moreover, Congress intended for § 922(g)(9) to apply to misdemeanants
who may not have had the right to a jury trial.338 As the Eleventh Circuit
determined in United States v. Chavez, the language in 18 U.S.C. § 921
specifically recognizes that individuals subject to § 922(g)(9) includes
misdemeanants who were not entitled to a jury trial in the underlying
offense.339 Thus, Congress authorized the provision’s application to
individuals who were not guaranteed the right to a jury trial and did not intend
for the provision to upgrade such offenses to serious offenses requiring jury
trials.340
One could argue that § 922(g)(9) was enacted before the Court explicitly
held that the Second Amendment right is individual and fundamental and,
thus, the provision is no longer consistent with this interpretation of the
Second Amendment. However, as this part discussed, precedent does not
focus on whether the right infringed is fundamental but rather whether the
right infringed is commensurate with the liberty interest infringed by a prison
term longer than six months.
Professor Crane argued that permanent firearm prohibitions, taken
together with the maximum authorized prison term, trigger the right to a jury
trial under the Sixth Amendment.341 This Note argues that the opposite is
true—that firearm prohibitions do not upgrade an otherwise petty offense—
because the firearm prohibition, taken together with the maximum six-month
prison term, does not result in an individual’s relevant liberty interests being
infringed to a degree comparable to the infringement resulting from a prison
333. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542.
334. See Crane, supra note 76, at 41.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 13–14.
337. Id.
338. See United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United
States v. Jardee, No. 09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2010).
339. 204 F.3d at 1314.
340. Id. Congress passed § 922(g)(9) in 1996, after the Supreme Court decided Blanton,
Baldwin, and Duncan. See supra Part I.A.; supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
341. Crane, supra note 76, at 59.
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term of more than six months. This Note reaches this conclusion on two
grounds. First, the Court’s precedent established a high bar for a collateral
consequence to upgrade an otherwise petty offense, which the firearm
prohibitions do not meet. And, the Court has never held that an additional
penalty overcomes the presumption of pettiness.342 Second, Congress
explicitly intended for the firearm prohibition to apply regardless of the
accused’s right to a jury trial in the underlying offense.343 There was no
intent for the provision to upgrade the underlying offenses.
While state statutes may not be as explicit as the federal law, the above
analysis applies equally. The Court’s test looks to whether the liberty interest
infringed is comparable to a prison term of more than six months. Though
the intent of each state legislature should be considered, this Note argues that
such intent should be explicit so as to override the analysis set forth above.
Absent such intent, under the Court’s test, such a prohibition does not
upgrade a petty offense.
Whether or not domestic violence misdemeanants have the right to a jury
trial may affect victim safety.344 Application and enforcement of firearm
prohibitions are also vital to domestic violence victims’ safety from gun
violence. The next section focuses on recommendations for advocates and
legislatures to enhance the safety of domestic violence victims with regard to
gun violence.
B. Enforcing and Expanding Gun Laws to Improve Victim Safety
This Note proposes that legislatures and domestic violence advocates
should focus on expanding and enforcing legislation that prohibits access to
firearms by those subject to civil protective orders.345 Civil protective orders
are more immediate than criminal convictions, are controlled by the victim,
and are immune from the challenge discussed in this Note.346
Under federal law, individuals subject to civil protective orders are
prohibited from possessing a firearm.347 A majority of states also have laws
that prohibit an individual, who is subject to a domestic violence restraining
order, from possessing a firearm.348 These protective orders are ordered by
a family or civil court, and the firearm prohibition is often limited in time to
the duration of the order.349 Thus, these provisions are shielded from the

342. See Kansas v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944–45 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
343. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(II)(aa)–(bb).
344. See Wilson, supra note 223.
345. While there are a number of measures that should be taken to reduce domestic violence
more generally—including education about and societal recognition of the pervasiveness of
the issue, access to support and justice for victims, batterer intervention programs for abusers,
expanded access to mental health and other social services, and criminal justice reform—this
Note focuses only on measures specific to preventing abusers’ access to firearms in order to
reduce the risk of gun violence for domestic violence victims.
346. Protective Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
347. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); supra Part I.C.1.
348. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
349. Protective Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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challenge discussed in this Note.350 Because these are civil orders, the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right, which applies in criminal prosecutions, is
inapplicable. In addition, while firearm prohibitions for domestic violence
misdemeanants are often permanent and thus infringe individual liberty
more, firearm prohibitions stemming from civil orders of protection are
confined to the period of the protective order.351 These laws also prove to be
effective: states with these laws report a reduction in domestic violence
homicides.352
While most states have enacted laws that restrict domestic violence
misdemeanants and abusers subject to civil protective orders from possessing
firearms, enforcement of these laws is lacking. Only sixteen states require
the relinquishment of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants or
abusers subject to restraining orders.353 This Note recommends that
advocates and legislatures focus on enforcement of firearm relinquishment
for misdemeanants and abusers who are subject to protective orders.
Enforcement of such laws has had positive results on reducing domestic
violence homicides.354
In 2003, the sheriff in King County, Washington, established a domestic
violence firearm enforcement unit that enforces firearm relinquishment and
forfeiture by individuals who are subject to domestic violence protective
orders.355 In 2018, the number of firearms forfeited to the unit was four times
the number forfeited in 2016.356 The program’s success is also reflected in
rearrest statistics. In 2006, of individuals who were rearrested after their
firearms were removed, 15 percent were arrested for domestic violence
charges and 20 percent for other crimes, but none of these individuals were
arrested for firearm possession.357
Amending legislation and establishing task forces nationwide at the county
level to work with sheriff’s offices, judges, and prosecutors to ensure that
domestic abusers forfeit their firearms would result in fewer firearms in the
hands of abusers. These task forces should focus on enforcement of gun
prohibitions stemming from both domestic violence civil orders of protection
and from misdemeanor convictions.
The focus on enforcement and the relinquishment of firearms by domestic
abusers should also be extended to ex parte orders of protection. When
individuals petition a civil or family court for a civil order of protection, they

350. See supra Part II. However, these provisions are not immune from constitutional
attacks. See David T. Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago:
The Present as Interface of Past and Future, 3 NE. U. L.J. 199, 214–16 (2011).
351. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); Protective Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
352. See supra Part I.C.3.
353. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
354. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 22; supra Part I.C.3.
355. See generally Andrew Klein, Disarming Batterers, Seattle Sheriffs Lead the Way,
QUINLAN, L. ENFORCEMENT EMP. BULL., Aug. 2006.
356. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, supra note 8, at 23.
357. Klein, supra note 355.
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are often granted a temporary order or ex parte order.358 The temporary order
remains in place until a hearing, following notice to the respondent, at which
point the court decides whether to extend the order or issue a final order of
protection.359 The federal firearm prohibition provision only applies after
this final order is issued.360 However, evidence shows that the most
dangerous time for domestic violence victims is the short period of time after
they leave their abusers.361 As such, twenty-two states have passed laws that
prohibit individuals subject to ex parte protection orders from possessing a
firearm.362 This Note encourages legislatures and advocates to focus on
passing ex parte provisions in states that do not have them, to lobby for an
amendment to the federal law to apply to ex parte orders, and to establish and
expand task forces that will enforce firearm prohibitions and require the
relinquishment of firearms temporarily. While this Note is mindful that such
laws are vulnerable to constitutional due process challenges that argue that
restricting an individual’s Second Amendment right without notice or a
hearing is unconstitutional, there are strong arguments to the alternative.
Other federal provisions permit firearm restrictions prior to or without a
criminal conviction, including provisions that prohibit firearm possession by
those subject to a felony indictment363 and by drug users.364
Challenges to domestic violence misdemeanor firearm prohibitions focus
on the permanence of such prohibitions. As such, advocates and state
legislatures might choose to pass or amend legislation that prohibits firearm
possession for domestic violence misdemeanants for a limited period of time.
While this approach would not prohibit firearm possession indefinitely, it
would prohibit the possession in the period following the initial separation
between the abuser and the victim, which is often the most dangerous time.365
Finally, judges, attorneys, and law enforcement presiding over or
practicing in family, civil, and criminal courts should receive training and
education about the compounding dangers that result when domestic abusers
have access to firearms. Increased training and education would likely lead
to judges, lawyers, and law enforcement taking victims’ fears and concerns
seriously and would likely increase safety through the application and
enforcement of firearm prohibitions.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that, consistent with the Supreme Court’s Sixth
Amendment jury trial precedent, domestic violence misdemeanants
convicted of petty misdemeanor offenses and subject to permanent firearm
358. Restraining Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Martin, supra note
183, at 267.
359. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178.
360. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
361. Mitchell, supra note 4.
362. Domestic Violence & Firearms, supra note 178.
363. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n); Martin, supra note 183, at 268.
364. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); Martin, supra note 183, at 268.
365. Mitchell, supra note 4.
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prohibitions are not guaranteed the right to a jury trial. The Court’s analysis
looks at whether the liberty interest infringed by a noncarceral punishment is
equivalent or comparable to the degree an individual’s liberty is infringed on
by a prison term of more than six months. While permanent firearm
prohibitions undoubtedly infringe on an individual’s liberty, they do not do
so in the form or degree that a prison term of more than six months does. As
such, courts should find, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that
firearm prohibitions do not upgrade presumptively petty offenses to
guarantee domestic violence misdemeanants the right to a jury trial.
Moreover, despite frequent challenges to firearm prohibitions and in light
of the ongoing danger guns present to victims of domestic violence and
society more generally, state and federal firearm legislation has been enacted
to reduce future violence. However, enforcement of firearm prohibitions is
lacking. Increasing enforcement and requiring abusers to relinquish firearms
in criminal and civil procedures would reduce access to guns by those this
proposed solution seeks to prohibit from possessing the guns. These
measures have and likely will continue to provide greater safety for victims.

